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NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
AND THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION:
AN EXPENSIVE ANOMALY
By BRUCE DUNLOP*
The objective of improved compensation for the victims of motor vehicle
accidents has had its champions for many years.' They have not, of course, all
pulled together. Some have functioned entirely within the context of the tort
liability system under which, ostensibly at least, the person suffering loss is
compensated by the person whose activity brought about the loss in accordance with the prevailing theory of liability, negligence.
Laws requiring motorists to insure against liability and schemes such as2
unsatisfied judgment funds or the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund,
accept the propriety of liability based on fault and merely try to ensure that
whenever there is liability there will also be resources to meet it. Provisions
such as the reversed onus of proof on the negligence issue aim at making it
easier for some victims, at least, 3 to establish entitlement to compensation.
One could say that although this legislative amendment appears to accept fault
as the appropriate theory for determining liability, a form of strict liability is
actually established; a motorist not at fault may be held liable for damages
because he or she fails to persuade a judge or jury that the damages did not
arise through his or her negligence. The fault principle is, to an extent, eroded.
The courts, too, the very founders of the tort liability system, have improved the lot of the victim over the years and have moved the tort regime
away from reliance on fault, at least in the traditional sense, as the basis for
determining entitlement to compensation. Aware that liability insurance absorbs the blow a judgment would otherwise represent to a defendant, judges
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1 One of the earliest articles on the subject is Rollins, Proposal to Extend the

Compensation Principle to Accidents in the Streets (1919), 4 Mass. L.Q. 392. A comprehensive "no-fault" plan was proposed in 1932: Columbia U. Council for Research
in the Social Sciences, Report of the Commission to Study Compensation for Automobile
Accidents (Philadelphia: Press of International Printing Co., 1932).
2 The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 281.
3
A typical provision is s. 133 of The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202
which provides as follows:
(1) When loss or damage is sustained by any person by reason of a motor vehicle
on a highway, the onus of proof that the loss or damage did not arise through
the negligence or improper conduct of the owner or driver of the motor
vehicle is upon the owner or driver.
(2) This section does not apply in case of a collision between motor vehicles or
between motor vehicles and cars of electric or steam railways or other motor
vehicles running only on stationary rails on the highway nor to an action
brought by a passenger in a motor vehicle in respect of any injuries sus-

tained by him while a passenger. R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 106.
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and juries are in a position to take a more sympathetic approach to the position of the plaintiff. Lord Denning expresses this view in a characteristically
4
blunt way in Nettleship v. Weston:
The high standard thus imposed by the judges is, I believe, largely the results of
the policy of the Road Traffic Acts. Parliament requires every driver to be insured
against third-party risks. The reason is so that a person injured by a motor-car
should not be left to bear the loss on his own, but should be compensated out of
the insurance fund. The fund is better able to bear it than he can. But the injured
person is only able to recover if the driver is liable in law. So the judges see to it
that he is liable, unless he can prove care and skill of a high standard: see The
Merchant Prince and Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins & Sons Ltd. Thus we are,
in this branch of the law, moving away from the concept: 'No liability without
fault'. We are beginning to apply the test: 'On whom should the risk fall?'

Not all judges would be willing to put it so strongly, but there can be
little doubt that the concept of fault, though still with us, has been transformed
from the notion of moral blameworthiness, which it may originally have been,
to include all kinds of mistakes and errors of judgment which drivers make
even though they try to avoid them.5
In some jurisdictions the courts have abandoned fault as the basis for
determining entitlement to compensation on the part of victims of defective
manufactured articles. Canadian courts have not gone as far; nor have courts
in any jurisdiction openly espoused strict liability in the area of motor vehicle
accident compensation. A "no-fault" approach to compensating victims of
motor vehicles nevertheless exists in many jurisdictions and it involves a departure, to a greater or lesser degree, from the notion that compensation
should be purely a matter of tort liability. Leaving aside the "no-fault" benefit
that many people now obtain by virtue of membership in schemes of general
application such as hospital and medical insurance, sick leave benefits, life
insurance, and other social insurance and welfare programmes, in many provinces of Canada and states of the United States they are entitled to accident benefits as part of the motor vehicle insurance package." Other provinces
and states seem likely to develop this sort of approach as well.7 The significance of the benefits varies markedly from one jurisdiction to another. For
example, in Ontario the maximum "no-fault" income benefit is $70 per week."
(In some provinces it is only $50) It is payable only for total disability and
.9

(1971] 3 All E.R. 581 at 586 (C.A.).
5 For a discussion of driver error, see Klein and Waller, Causation, Culpability and
Deterrence in Highway Crashes, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Automobile Insurance
and Compensation Study, Section 3, "Characteristics of Individuals Involved in Crashes
and Violations" (Washington, 1970). And see Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed.
Sydney: Law Book Co., 1971), ch. 6; Milner, Negligence in Modern Law (London:
Butterworths, 1967) at 231-32.
GThe Ontario provisions are contained in Schedule "E" of The Insurance Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 224 as amended by 1971, c. 84.
7 For example, the Government of Quebec is considering the Report of the Special
Committee on Automobile Insurance (Quebec, 1974) which recommends a "no-fault"
plan for that province.
8 The Insurance Act, supra, note 6.
0 The Alberta Insurance Act, R.S.A. 1970,, c. 187 as amended by 1971, c. 53; The
Manitoba Automobile Insurance Act, 1970, c. 102.
4
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it lasts up to two years if the victim cannot perform his or her job. It may
continue beyond the two years if the individual is unable to do any job for
which he or she may be suited by education or experience. The medical, hospital and rehabilitation benefits go to $5,000 but only pay on a second-loss
basis; that is, if the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) or some other
source does not cover the loss. The death benefits for a head of household
survived by a spouse and two children are $7,000. This is a "no-fault" plan
that provides a little something to tide the accident victim over until he or
she can assert a tort claim. It does not provide much comfort for the victim
who is unable to establish a tort claim.
On the other hand, in the Michigan plan,10 although the medical, hospital
and rehabilitation expenses are also covered on a second-loss basis, the income
protection limit is $1,000 per month for three years and the death benefits in
the example already used could be $1,000 a month over the same period.
The Michigan plan has a million dollar property protection feature as well.
The development of plans of this sort has not been without its opponents,
even among those who favour improving the lot of the accident victims. "Nofault" has been regarded as a retrograde step rather than as an advance by
some.'" Now, however, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that
most modern champions of improved compensation favour or at least accept
the "no-fault" approach. But this does not mean they have begun to pull
together. Perhaps the most fundamental issue dividing them is the respective
roles of the negligence action and two-party "no-fault" insurance.
In Ontario, for example, three views as to how the lot of the motor
vehicle accident victim should be improved have recently been expressed by
the insurance industry, a lawyers' group and the Ontario Law Reform Commission. All favour "no-fault" benefits but the Insurance Bureau of Canada's
Variplan' 2 and the Advocates' Society's submission to the Ontario Minister
of Consumer and Commercial Relations 13 both envisage continued reliance on
the negligence action as well, to different degrees. The Law Reform Commission, on the other hand, recommends complete reliance on accident insurance
and the abolition of the motor vehicle negligence action.14
IF "NO-FAULT', WHY NEGLIGENCE?
If the fundamental difference between proponents of "no-fault" lies in
their attitude towards the role of the negligence action, then the most funda'0 Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated s. 500, 3101 et seq.
11 E.g. Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem
Auto Compensation Plans (1964), 31 U. Ch. L. Rev. 641; Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact,
Fiction, Fallacy (1973), 44 Miss. LJ. 15.
12
Fraser, Tomorrrow's Auto Insurance, in A Symposium on No-Fault Automobile
Insurance (1974), 8. L. Soc. Gazette 17.
13 Reported in the Globe and Mail, Toronto, Feb. 19, 1975.
14 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Motor Vehicle Accident Compen-

sation (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1973). New Zealand, of course,
has an accident compensation scheme that extends to all injuries, however caused, and
replaces the tort action.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 13, NO. 2

mental criticism that one hears of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
proposal is that it recommends the abolition of the tort action. It is important,
therefore, to consider the reasons for this recommendation and the reasons
that have been advanced by its critics.
If one favours the institution of "no-fault" insurance and at the same
time favours the retention of the tort action one is saying, in effect, that
"no-fault" insurance provides a part of the answer, but not the whole answer,
to the problem of compensating the motor vehicle accident victim. One is
saying that accident insurance can benefit the victim in a way the tort action
does not. At the same time, one is saying that the tort action achieves objectives impossible under "no-fault" insurance alone.
What is "no-fault" insurance? As established in many jurisdictions and
as proposed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, it is first-party, or
two-party accident insurance. The owner of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle,
the passengers in a vehicle, pedestrians struck by the vehicle and persons
(other than the owners or occupants of other vehicles) upon whom the
vehicle inflicts property damage are insured under the policy applicable to
that vehicle and would claim against the insurer of that vehicle for any loss
suffered. Thus, for example, in a two-car collision involving damage to both
vehicles and injury to occupants of both, the victims claim against their own
vehicle's insurer rather than against the owner or driver of the other vehicle.
Comparing this type of insurance with third party liability insurance and
the negligence action as sources of compensation one finds first, that "nofault" insurance compensates all victims of motor vehicle injuries; 15 the tort
regime does not and the greater the loss, the less adequate, on average, the
compensation provided by the tort regime. 16 It is sometimes argued that the
improvement in "collateral sources", by which are meant the programmes
such as medical and hospital insurance, sick pay benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, and other schemes that are not expressly concerned with
motor vehicle injuries but which nevertheless compensate for some of their
losses, have made this problem less pressing. It would be sanguine, however,
to believe that it has ceased to be a problem and that therefore the validity of
this objective of universal compensation has been destroyed. Indeed, those
who favour a "mixed" system see this objective as one justification of the
"no-fault" element.
Second, "no-fault" insurance compensates quickly, providing periodic
payments for loss of income or financial support, and dealing with medical,
hospital, and other expenses as they arise. The tort regime compensates relatively slowly, although fairly rapid settlement of smaller claims is possible.
UsThere are, of course, exceptions. The O.L.R.C. proposal would, for example,
exclude loss deliberately inflicted on his or her own person or property by the claimant
and loss suffered in the course of committing a criminal offence (other than a driving

offence).
16 Where amounts in excess of $25,000 in pecuniary loss are involved, for example,
recovery is in the vicinity of 20% on the average. That is, taking the total compensation
paid, including non-pecuniary heads, only 20% of the aggregate pecuniary loss suffered
is compensated. See O.L.R.C. Report, supra, note 14 at 50-51.
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The important point, however, is that the greater and more debilitating the
injury, and therefore the more urgent the need for compensation, the longer
it takes. Delays of several years are the norm in serious accident cases.17 One
can explain why this is inevitable under the tort regime. For example, in a
once-for-all system of compensation one must wait until the loss picture is as
clear as possible before settling the matter. But this does not justify the delay
in any absolute sense. Again, improved collateral sources have taken some of
the burden off the victim in this regard, but earlier compensation remains a
shared objective of those who favour retention of the negligence action and
those who do not.
"No-fault" insurance, because it does not involve a once-for-all assessment of loss, permits accurate account to be taken of changes that may occur
as time goes by. The tort regime cannot do this. If, for example, the accident
victim at the date of an assessment of damages has, as far as the medical
expert can foresee, a fifty-fifty chance of developing arthritis as a result of
an injury, the allowance made for this in the lump-sum award is bound to be
wrong. "Full" compensation will be determined but will then be reduced
because of the uncertainty of the event occurring. If the victim does not
develop arthritis, the compensation for this prospective problem will have
been excessive. If the victim develops arthritis then less than full compensation will have been inadequate.
These are strong points in favour of "no-fault", but what does the tort
regime do that the "no-fault" approach does not? As already suggested, it
provides damages for pain and suffering, loss of the amenities of life and
shortened expectation of life, and it is the right to recover damages of this
type that is often relied upon as a justification for retaining the negligence
action in a mixed system.' 8 There is a certain "best of both worlds" appeal
to this approach. On the other hand, there are arguments, both philosophical
and practical, against continuing the practice of awarding damages under these
heads which persuaded the Law Reform Commission to recommend abolition
of the motor vehicle negligence action.
MONEY AS ANALGESIC
Mr. Justice Windeyer has very aptly described damages for pain and
suffering, loss of the amenities of life and shortened expectation of life as
"solace for a condition created" rather than "payment for something taken
away". 19 Pursuing this analysis he observed, "It may be that giving damages
for physical pain that is wholly past, not continuing and not expected to recur,
is simply an anomaly, for there can be no solace for past pain".2 0 In the case
of permanent injuries, which may involve continuing pain, physical handicap
and shortened expectation of life, solace may be possible, but it does not
follow that the most effective way of achieving it is through the payment of
Id. at p. 56 et seq.
-8 See, e.g., the Advocates' Society's submission, supra, note 13.
17

19Skelton v. Collins (1966),

20 Id.

39 A.L.J.R. 480 at 495 (Aust. H.C.).
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a sum of money which remains highly uncertain until determined by a judge
or jury and which is paid long after the event.
Every statistical study has indicated that the greater and more debilitating
the injury, the less likely it is that a tort claim will result in adequate compensation, even for the pecuniary losses suffered.2 1 It therefore seems likely
that the solace provided to the totality of accident victims through the knowledge that their medical, hospital, rehabilitation and income needs would be
certain to be covered would outweigh the comfort provided by the tort regime to the small minority of serious injury victims who achieve eminent
success on an assessment of damages. Especially is this so when it is realized
that rehabilitation, which means "the restoration of the handicapped to the
fullest physical, mental, social, vocational and economic usefulness of which
they are capable"2 2, requires that every effort be made to develop in the
victim an attitude which stresses the achievements that can be made rather
than the tragedy that has occurred. Money spent immediately, not only on
medical and hospital services but on psychological and rehabilitation services
and in due course, if necessary, on socio-economic counselling, vocational
evaluation and vocational training, with no need for the victim to be concerned about how he or she is to be supported or about who will pay the bills
on behalf of his or her family, will achieve the most by way of rehabilitation,
and therefore "solace", for most accident victims. On the other hand, the
possibility of a very substantial lump sum award of non-pecuniary "losses"
can be subversive
of recovery because as Professors Keeton and O'Connell
23
conclude:
any victim will (rightfully) fear getting less if he appears before a jury fully
healed or rehabilitated (with, for instance an artificial leg that he can expertly use),
very often he will forego treatment or rehabilitation during the long delay between
accident and trial in order to appear before a sympathetic jury as pathetically
handicapped as possible...

and the Royal Commisison of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury
in New Zealand observed in similar vein that24
injured persons have failed to accept the assistance of rehabilitation because of
pending claims for damages or compensation. They have preferred to wait the
outcome of contested proceedings lest the prospective capital award should be
diminished by their own successful efforts to overcome the disability.

Contention, delay, expense, uncertainty -

all features of the action for

damages for non-pecuniary "losses" - also inhibit rehabilitation to the
25
detriment both of the accident victim and of society.
On the question of solace for pain that is past, one can make the argument that as a matter of priorities, the payment of pecuniary losses should
come first. If that were all there was to it, one could perhaps say that, if we
2

1 Supra, note 14 at 50, 56.
of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal
Injury in New Zealand (Wellington, 1967).
23
Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for
Reforming Automobile insurance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965) at 31-32.
22 Report

24

Supra, note 22 at 77.

25

See O.L.R.C. Report, supra, note 14, Ch. VI.
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can afford to "compensate" for pain and suffering as well, let us do so. In
the case of future pain and loss of amenities it goes beyond being a matter of
priorities and becomes a case of avoiding conflicting pressures. Money should
certainly be spent on the well-being of the personal injury accident victim. It
is a question of the form in which such expenditures will be most likely to
achieve the desired objective. Money spent on facilities and services to care
for and rehabilitate the handicapped may achieve this objective,2" Money
spent on lump-sum awards may not.
THE TORT ACTION AS CORRECTIVE
It is sometimes argued that tort law requires wrong-doers to bear responsibility for their "innocent" victims. 2 7 A number of fallacies underlie this
argument. The use of the expression "wrong-doer" to describe a negligent
motorist, implies a kind of moral blame which, as already noted, is not
always present. Granted that some negligent motorists are also morally
blameworthy, and therefore should be called to account for their behaviour,
is there any reason why criminal and regulatory sanctions cannot be relied
upon to serve this purpose? In any case, the punitive objective which seems
to underlie this argument for retaining the damage award seems to ignore
the fact that in most cases the responsibility, at least in practical terms, is
borne by the "wrong-doer's" insurance company. Furthermore, the vast
majority of cases are settled without resort to trial, many of them without
resort to legal advice,28 and therefore without resort to an accurate definition
of fault. Any notion of visiting responsibility on a wrong-doer may take second place to other considerations such as the duration, cost and uncertainty
of litigation and the urgency of the accident victim's need for money.
In the small minority of cases that go to trial it can legitimately be questioned whether fault determines responsibility even then. In the words of the
Honourable J. C. McRuer, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Ontario:2
Dean Wright has said: 'Lawyers supporting the trial jury are willing to admit that
in the ordinary automobile accident the case that is actually tried by a jury is a
case that never in fact took place, and is the result of conjectural recall, imagination, colourful dramatization, and pure inventiveness.' I do not think Dean Wright
has overstated the case, but I would not restrict his comments to those cases tried
by a jury.

Motor vehicle accidents are events which occur suddenly, taking the witnesses,
including the participants, by surprise and resulting in imperfect perception.
Months, even years, after the event, they are called upon to assess distances,
relative speeds, time elapsed; all matters as to which they have little or no
26
27

Id. See, also, Ch. XI.
See, e.g., Griffths, Don't Abolish Tort Law in Auto Accident Compensation

(1969), 12 Can. Bar J. 187 at 190.
28
Linden, Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of
Automobile Accidents (Toronto, 1965). at V-14 found that a lawyer was consulted in
37.3% of cases examined. It seems likely that legal aid, by improving access to legal
services, may have increased the percentage of cases in which lawyers are involved. It
is unlikely that legal aid has completely solved the problem.
29
McRuer, "Liability Without Fault in the Law of Torts", in Macdonald, ed.,
Changing Legal Objectives (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1963) at 63-64.
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experience. It is expecting too much of the trial process, effective as it may
be generally, to elicit from them the truth, no matter how sincere the witnesses may be.
A favourite example with which the tort "abolitionist" is faced is that
of the drunken driver who crashes into the back of a motionless vehicle with
the result that both drivers are seriously injured. The idea that both injury
victims should be equally compensated tends to produce a sense of outrage
against the whole notion of "no-fault" compensation.30 It is important to
remember that the vast majority of injury cases are not this case and should
not be affected by it. At the same time, it must be admitted that this situation
poses a difficult problem. If one wishes the drunk to be punished there is, of
course, the criminal sanction. There remains, however, a reluctance on the
part of some to allow the drunk to be compensated under "no-fault". The fact
is, nevertheless, that a disabled person needs support and so do his or her
dependants. However outraged one might be by this form of behaviour it
hardly seems in the interest of society to exclude these people from the
necessary compensation for their losses. If punishment, for whatever reason,
be it deterrence or reformation or vengeance, is required to be rigorous, let
it be through the criminal sanction.
Two other values that are said to belong to the tort action and not to
"no-fault" insurance are those of educating the public as to the expected
standard of behaviour and deterring departure from it.3 1 However, since only
a small percentage of motor vehicle accident claims ever reaches the courts
and only a tiny percentage of these gets significant publicity which, in any
case, is more likely to educate as to the level of damage awards than as to
the standard of care, it is an elaborate and expensive system to be maintained
for such a dubious return. One would have thought that driver training, publicity campaigns and enforcement of Criminal Code and The Highway Traffc
Act provisions would achieve this goal, if it is attainable. As for deterrence
the New York State Insurance Department, in its report to the Governor, said
this:3 2
individual, last-moment driver mistakes - undeterred by fear of death, injury,
imprisonment, fine or loss of licence - surely cannot be deterred by fear of
civil liability against which one is insured. Indeed, as a matter of logic, the contrary
is true. The careless driver is protected by insurance, while his victim can be left
with much of the cost that originally fell upon him. We confront the bizarre conclusion that if the fault insurance system is a deterrent to anything, it is more of
a deterrent to becoming a victim than to driving carelessly.

CRYSTAL GAZING
It has been said that the statistical studies considered by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission in assessing the existing compensation system are
out of date. 33 But the only significant changes in recent years for which there
30 The writer has faced this argument from lawyers when participating in panel

discussions on "no-fault".
31 See
32

Linden, CanadianNegligence Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 474-86.

New York (State) Insurance Department, Automobile Insurance ... For Whose
Benefit? (New York, 1970) at 12.
3

sThis criticism has been expressed in panel discussions in which the writer has
participated.
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is any evidence lie in the area of collateral benefits, as the Commission noted
in its report.04 Apart from the fact that they still do not adequately close the
gap between accident losses and accident reparation, they do not constitute
an argument for the retention of the tort action. In itself, it remains as deficient as the studies showed it to be; too slow, too uncertain, not adequately
productive of the objectives of a reparation system. Nor does the fact that
legal aid may defray the individual's expense of litigating reduce the cost to
society of a system that costs almost as much to administer as it returns to
accident victims in benefits.8 5 Improvement in the position of the accident
victim through improved collateral benefits, points the direction to be taken.
The view of the Law Reform Commission that adequate pecuniary compensation should be paid, and should be charged, to the extent that it is feasible,
to the activity of motoring, leads to the ultimate conclusion that an accident
insurance programme with the premiums paid by those who engage in motoring is the appropriate device 8 6
It is probably the case that concern over the level of premiums will lead
to a gradual approach to such a change. But cost in the wider sense can
hardly be an issue because the cost is being borne already: by those who pay
premiums for medical and hospital insurance, accident insurance, disability
insurance, unemployment insurance; by employers; by taxpayers; by accident
victims who go uncompensated or inadequately compensated as well as by
motorists who buy automobile insurance; in short, by society and the economy
as a whole. The question is not, can we afford it, but how should we afford
it? In other words, cost-benefit, rather than cost, is the issue. "No-fault" will
produce the greatest benefit per dollar spent. If its premiums are higher it
will be because some of the cost has been shifted to motoring from the sources
that now bear it. This will be a good, not a bad thing. It will give a truer
indication of the real cost of motoring. There is no reason, however, to believe that a "no-fault" compensation scheme would result in premium levels
significantly different from those that will face the motorist under the existing
system.87
The writer's view is that the biggest impediment in the way of abolishing
the tort action is the emotional commitment to the notion of damages for
pain and suffering and the other non-pecuniary heads. It would be possible to
introduce this type of compensation into "no-fault" provided a formula for
calculating it were established. This could even be made an optional extra to
a basic, compulsory policy that compensated only for pecuniary loss. This
solution seems unlikely to satisfy the "retentionist" however since the levels
of such compensation would necessarily be conventional and moderate. The
writer would predict, therefore, that the tort action will be retained but that
"no-fault" benefits will continue to increase in importance. Ultimately, the
cost of retaining the negligence action for the limited purpose and value it will
serve will be seen as unjustified. The tort action may die hard but it will die.
84

Supra, note 14 at 52.
35 Id. at 71-73.
36 Id. at 101-05.
87 Id., chapt. 14.

